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Atypical integration is a topic of debate in the autism literature. Some theories suggest
that altered perception in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is due to a failure to integrate
information from meaningful context into the final percept, whereas others suggest that
integration of low-level features is impaired. Empirical research which forms the basis
for these theories has failed to account for higher-level influences not inherent in the
stimuli (i.e., instructions and goals) and assess integration at both lower and higher
perceptual levels within the same task. Here, we describe how perceived expectations
and goals of a task can modulate the processing of low-level visual input via the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC). We then go on to illustrate how future research might assess
the relative contribution of both low and high-level processes using the same paradigm.
We conclude by recommending that when results appear conflicting, consideration of
the relative strength of low-level input vs. feedback or high-level processes may prove
helpful. Importantly, research in this area needs to more broadly consider the various
influences on perception, and find better ways to assess the contributions of early and
later visual processes.
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Sensory abnormalities are observed in a large proportion of people with Autism SpectrumDisorder
(ASD; Geschwind, 2009) and many clinical, parental, and personal reports focus on atypically
intense attention to, or avoidance of, sensory information (Williams, 1998; Bogdashina, 2003;
Grandin, 2006; Ben-Sasson et al., 2009). Although people with an ASD diagnosis exhibit superior
performance in some tasks, such as block design and finding embedded figures (Muth et al.,
2014), deficits are also shown in simple visual tasks such as orientation or motion detection
(Simmons et al., 2009; Figure 1). There is considerable disagreement regarding the mechanisms
underlying atypical perception, however a common theme is abnormal integration (Dakin et al.,
2005; Simmons et al., 2009). When the ASD literature discusses visual integration, it is often
within the reference frame of higher-level information derived from the stimulus such as its
meaning or surrounding context. For instance, Plaisted et al. (1999) note that individuals with
ASD do not exhibit a global interference effect of contextual information in a divided attention
Navon-type task (Navon, 1977). However, even when stimuli appear devoid of meaning there may
be higher-level influence in the form of personal goals or task expectations. Current perceptual
theories of ASD disagree as to whether integration is affected at early (i.e., lower) or later
(i.e., higher) levels of visual processing. To date, there has been little success in disentangling
these experimentally. This paper will first give a brief overview of the visual pathway and then
outline how current theories attempt to explain atypical visual integration in autism. We then
discuss important considerations that need to be addressed in this area of research; specifically,
how an individual’s goals or understanding of a task can exhibit modulatory feedback upon
low-level vision through the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Finally, we provide an example
of how integration at both lower and higher levels could be assessed independently in the same task.
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Visual perception is commonly conceptualized as
hierarchical, with inputs arriving in area V1 from the thalamus,
and being successively processed in a number of different areas.
Neural response properties vary along the visual hierarchy, with
latency increases that imply more complex processing when
moving from earlier to later areas such as the inferotemporal
cortex (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000). Receptive field sizes
also increase, implying convergence of inputs from lower- to
higher-level areas (Poggio and Riesenhuber, 1999; Rao and
Ballard, 1999).
Low-level integration begins to take place once simple local
features, such as the orientation and location of lines and
edges, are extracted from primary visual input in areas V1
and V2 (Hubel and Wiesel, 1962). The outputs of these areas,
which are comprised of local representations, are then gradually
consolidated, binding together different stimulus features to
represent a global or overall shape at successive levels of the
visual system (Kourtzi et al., 2003; Rousselet et al., 2004; Roe
et al., 2012). For instance, in Figure 1B, the orientation of each
line in both the simple/component and complex shapes would
be extracted by early visual filters. These components would
be combined at a later stage, within the lateral occipital cortex
(Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2001), to form the overall shapes.
Once simple visual features are consolidated, in feedforward
models of vision, their signals are projected to higher levels
of the cortex such as the inferotemporal and prefrontal areas,
where sensory input is integrated with attention and task
demands. Areas such as the orbitofrontal cortex and mPFC are
thought to play a central role in the evaluation of potential
outcomes (Shalom, 2005; Bar, 2007) by limiting the number of
possible representations for a viewed object (Bar et al., 2006),
assisting with identification of objects, and categories (Tanaka,
1996). Alternative conceptualizations of the visual system (e.g.,
Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002) propose that this higher level
processing occurs early and projects information downsteam as
needed, biasing early visual processing from the start.
In Figure 1B, the extraction and integration of component
edges is influenced by possible representations of the overall
shape (i.e., a house or a rectangle with a triangle on top). If
an individual identifies the target for which they are searching
as a ‘‘house’’ this will increase and reinforce attention towards
the outline of this shape. However, integration of irrelevant
distractor features, such as color, may impair the identification
of the house.
Integration in ASD
There is consistent evidence of an atypical visual processing
style of ASD (Dakin and Frith, 2005; Behrmann et al., 2006;
Simmons et al., 2009), commonly manifesting as deficits in
global processing (i.e., processing of the whole object or scene)
or superior low-level processing. Most current theories of ASD
attempt to provide explanations for this atypical integration.
Weak central coherence theory (WCC; Happé and Frith,
2006) proposes that individuals with ASD have a detail-focused
cognitive style where they are unable to bind details into
more global forms. There is also a bias away from integrating
higher-level information such as context. In support, individuals
with ASD have been shown to exhibit faster performance in tasks
involving embedded figures (Shah and Frith, 1983; Jolliffe and
Baron-Cohen, 1997) and block design (Shah and Frith, 1993),
where a lack of global feature-binding would be advantageous.
In contrast to WCC, the enhanced perceptual functioning
(EPF) hypothesis (Mottron and Burack, 2001) focuses on
evidence that low-level perception is enhanced in people with
ASD. Mottron et al. (2006) suggest that the integration of
‘‘higher-order’’ information—which is automatic in typically
developing/developed (TD) populations—is optional in those
with ASD, meaning that the default setting of perception is
more locally-oriented. Basic visual functioning may be superior
in ASD populations but low-level integration of features may
be impaired. This is supported by the literature that has
demonstrated that although people with ASD appear to have
intact or superior processing of simple dynamic stimuli (Bertone
et al., 2005; Pellicano et al., 2005), they exhibit poor performance
when required to combine simple visual features such as in
texture-defined second-order gratings (Bertone et al., 2005)
or motion coherence tasks (Milne and Szczerbinski, 2009;
Koldewyn et al., 2011).
These theories conceptualize high-level and low-level
processes as separate entities. However, these processes are
not so easily dissociable; neurons in the visual cortex receive
feedforward information (from the retina), feedback (from
higher cortical areas) and have inputs from lateral connections.
Research has increasingly focused on examining the interplay
between these sources of information using a variety of tasks
including figure-ground segregation (Vandenbroucke et al.,
2009), degraded face and object recognition (Loth et al., 2010),
and contextual modulation caused by collinear facilitation and
contour integration (Jachim et al., 2015). All found a difference
in modulatory feedback in individuals with autism. The exact
nature of this difference in ASD is yet to be determined: it has
been proposed to be both enhanced (Vandenbroucke et al.,
2009), and reduced (Loth et al., 2010; Jachim et al., 2015).
Hypo-prior theory (HPT) has framed the perceptual
atypicalities found in ASD in terms of a failure to incorporate
modulatory feedback. HPT proposes that people with ASD may
perceive the world differently due to attenuated priors (Pellicano
and Burr, 2012). Priors encode biases towards attributes that are
most likely, based on previous experience. They can improve the
efficiency of neural computations by acting as constraints and
reducing noise or error. Reduced priors lead to a decrease in
the influence of context and prior knowledge causing superior
performance in certain tasks. Like EPF, HPT predicts that people
with ASD ought to rely more heavily on low-level sensory
information, but does so by implicating reduced feedback.
However, high-level information may come in a number of
different forms (see Brock, 2012), and in its current form, HPT
only considers perceptual sources of high-level information.
Similar to HPT, Lawson et al. (2014), Sinha et al. (2014) and
Van de Cruys et al. (2014) propose prediction-based explanations
for ASD. Here, the relative influence of prior beliefs (high-
level information) compared to sensory evidence (low-level
information) is controlled by the precision of predictions made
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of the stimuli that are used to explore low- and
high-level visual integration in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). (A)
The block design task (Wechsler, 2011). This task requires line drawings to
be broken up into logical units, so that individual blocks can be used to
reconstruct the original design. Here the shape above is constructed of the
blocks below. (B)The embedded figures test (Witkin et al., 1971). Here, the
participant is asked to find a simple component shape (above, in the
example given) within a complex design (below). There is an increase in
performance in both the block design task and the embedded figures test if
there is a lack of automatic global processing. (C) First and second order
gratings. Bertone et al. (2005) asked participants to determine the orientation
of two different types of gratings, one which only contained first-order
information (upper grating, which is composed of changes in luminance) and
the other contained second order information (lower grating, which consists
of differences in texture). (D) Global motion perception using random-dot
kinetograms (RDKs). When presented in a motion sequence, a certain
proportion of the dots in an RDK move in the same direction (signal dots;
black arrows) whilst the rest move in a random direction (noise dots; white
arrows)—the participant is asked to specify the perceived overall direction of
the stimuli. Processing both second-order visual stimuli and RDKs involves
integrating information from multiple visual channels and should be worse if
there are deficits in low-level visual integration.
by higher-level brain areas. Sensory evidence that has not been
predicted is termed ‘‘prediction error’’. The precision of these
prediction errors is thought to determine the relative weight
of high- and low-level information. Perceptual atypicalities in
ASD have been proposed to occur both due to poor prediction
(Sinha et al., 2014) and an over weighting of prediction errors,
leading to missing of patterns and regularities (Van de Cruys
et al., 2013, 2014). In Figure 1B, for instance, the integration
of the larger shape has not been reliably learnt from previous
experience. A further alternative explanation proposes that the
pattern of impairment is due to increased precision of low-
level input, leading to over-reliance on sensory signals (Friston
et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2014). Thus, there is a reduction in
the weighting of higher-level information and less suppression
of sensory information by prior information. In Figure 1B, for
people with ASD, there might be reduced suppression of the local
features by the larger shape.
In summary, with the exception of EPF, all theories discussed
illustrate how a failure to incorporate feedback correctly can
result in atypical visual integration. However, most empirical
research in this area has considered meaning to be inherent
in the stimulus—for instance, a stimulus may be immediately
identifiable or similar to stored perceptual representations in
memory. However, even when a stimulus appears to be absent
of meaning (e.g., abstract lines), visual processing can be
affected by the viewer’s own goals or their interpretation of task
expectations.
The Role of Goals and Expectations
in Visual Feedback
An individual’s goals and expectations can affect attention,
reduce the time taken to respond to stimuli and increase
performance (Bravo and Nakayama, 1992). Attention to a
particular location, or feature, can be characterized in terms of
enhancement of neural responses (gain control) and suppression
of neural responses outside the focus of attention (Motter, 1993;
Chen et al., 2008). The enhancement of neural responses can be
observed throughout the visual cortex (Motter, 1993) and the
temporal lobe (Tanaka, 1996; Liu et al., 2009). The magnitude
of the attentional effects throughout the visual system depends
upon the nature of the task and the configuration of the stimulus
(Watanabe et al., 1998; Ito and Gilbert, 1999). Li et al. (2004)
trained monkeys to indicate the central point on a line and
discriminate misalignment between the same lines. Critically,
although identical stimuli were used in both tasks, the patterns of
cell activity depended on which task was being performed. That
the understanding of a task can vastly change activation patterns
resonates with the effects of task instructions on cognitive tests in
those with ASD (White, 2013).
Task instructions have been shown to have a differential
effect on performance by those with ASD on the Navon task
(Plaisted et al., 1999); when individuals were not told which level
(i.e., global or local) to search for the target, those with ASD
were better than typically developing (TD) children at finding
the target at the local level. However, where they were told to
search only one level to identify the target, both groups were
faster when identifying the larger global letter than the local
letter. As previously has been argued (Shalom, 2005; Bzdok
et al., 2013), it is specifically under circumstances of ambiguity
where those with ASD may perform differently. The mPFC may
serve a specific purpose by means of establishing an order of
importance (i.e., global) in TD individuals whereas it does not
do so in the ASD group. When attention is directed to a single
level, individuals with ASD do not perform differently as the
possibilities are minimized. When cued to look for a specific
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feature, the selectivity of neuronal receptive fields in early visual
area V1 changes to a form which approximates the cued feature
(McManus et al., 2011). Even at the earliest stages of visual
processing, neurons can be dynamically adjusted to be selective
for complex geometries from top-down influences. Returning to
Figure 1B, the failure to find the hidden figure might reflect that
the entire shape is bound by a high-level automatic grouping
mechanism. Once enough processing has occurred to identify
the overall complex shape the filters of the early visual system
can adjust to become more selective for these salient features,
effectively hiding the embedded figure. It has been observed that
the frontal and parietal brain areas (including the mPFC) exhibit
reduced activation during the embedded figures task in ASD
populations compared to controls (Lee et al., 2007; Damarla et al.,
2010; Spencer et al., 2012). Previously, these areas were thought
to be involved in suppression of global perceptual bias (so the
reduced activation of the ASD group may be interpreted as a sign
that the global form of the complex visual figure was processed to
a lesser extent by the ASD than control children; Lux et al., 2004;
Lee et al., 2007)—however, this can also be interpreted as reduced
activation of the feedback pathways.
High-level processing is key to understanding perception
and the back projections that are present throughout the visual
system are likely to play an important role in the integration of
low-level with high-level information. Until recently, research
on visual perception in ASD has tended to focus on either
low-level vision or higher-level influences (Simmons et al.,
2009). Since differences in visual processing in individuals with
ASD are not isolated to either the higher (global) or low-level
(local) domains, perhaps a more parsimonious explanation is
that interaction between low- and high-level mechanisms is less
developed in this population. Thus, the theories that emphasize
the interaction between low- and high-level mechanisms are
a welcome development and are consistent with evidence that
indicates that brain connectivity is disrupted in ASD (Barttfeld
et al., 2011; Wass, 2011; Samson et al., 2012). Enhanced resource
allocation in early visual areas, due to a lack of suppression of
irrelevant details could explain the heightened performance of
those with ASD in low-level visual tasks. However to-date, there
is little evidence to discriminate between the specific alternatives
(see Skewes et al., 2015; Westerfield et al., 2015, for two relevant
studies). One paradigm that may allow differentiation between
the contributions of feedforward and feedback processing in
visual perception is shape constancy.
Example: Shape Constancy
Shape constancy is the phenomenon where regardless of an
object’s orientation, the shape of the object is perceived as the
same (Figure 2). Ropar and Mitchell (2002) asked participants
to replicate the retinal projection of a tilted circle. When
participants knew the true shape, both ASD and TD participants
increased the circularity of their reproduced shape, as predicted
by shape constancy. However, in the ASD group this increase
was significantly smaller. They concluded that perception in ASD
was less influenced by prior knowledge, which can in the present
context be interpreted as a reduction in the modulatory feedback.
For TD participants, the higher-level information interfered
with the task whereas participants with ASD reported veridical
perception more easily (see, Liu et al., 2011, for a brain imaging
result consistent with this interpretation).
However, shape perception and constancy can be elicited
by both low- and high- level visual cues. Low-level cues
to slant such as linear perspective (Howard et al., 2014)
and binocular disparity (Hibbard et al., 2012) can induce
shape constancy, even when the participant does not know
the true shape. Ropar and Mitchell (2002) allowed binocular
viewing, which may have caused shape constancy from binocular
disparity. This leads to a second possible explanation of Ropar
and Mitchell’s findings; individuals with ASD may be less
able to utilize disparity due to an increased prevalence of
deficits with convergence or strabismus (Scharre and Creedon,
1992; Milne et al., 2009). The reduction in shape constancy
observed in ASD may be explained by an inability to use
FIGURE 2 | When a cup is viewed obliquely, the retinal projection of the
lip of the cup forms an ellipse. Despite the apparent transformation, the
viewer knows that the “real shape” of the lip of the cup is circular—this is the
phenomenon of shape constancy. When asked to reproduce the retinal
projection of the ellipse, shape constancy means that the observer is unable to
accurately determine the true retinal projection. Instead, the observer will
reproduce what is labeled the “perceived shape”, represented in the above
image as being between the retinal projection and the real shape.
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low-level cues to slant rather than a reduced effect of prior
knowledge.
A final possibility is that feedback connections caused prior
knowledge of true shape to change perception by adjusting
receptive fields. It may be the case that people with ASD were
influenced by prior knowledge but its modulatory effect was
different compared to TD groups. For instance, prior knowledge
may cause a decrease in shape constancy elicited by binocular
disparity for participants with ASD but actually increase the
efficacy of disparity for the TD group.
We aim to highlight the importance of considering perception
as an interactive and dynamic process where the integration of
low- and high-level sources of information may differ between
populations. Research in this domain is often unable to come to
a consensus due to conflicting data. Methodological differences
may account for these discrepancies. For instance, some existing
results appear dependent on participant characteristics such as
IQ (Jarrold and Brock, 2004), on task demands (e.g., with the
Navon task; Navon, 1977) or on the exact instructions given
(Plaisted et al., 1998; Ropar and Mitchell, 1999, 2001). Each
of these changes will produce different top-down modulations
of low-level mechanisms, relating to different connectivity
pathways between frontal and visual regions (for a review, see
Martínez-Sanchis, 2014). Within the context of shape constancy,
it has been found that results depend on how subjects interpret
instructions. Even when they are instructed to replicate the
retinal projection, they may believe they are being asked
to replicate a shape that matches the actual inclined shape
(Howard et al., 2014). Differing interpretation of instructions
can change expectancies, modulating the importance and/or
salience of different features of the stimulus. This will affect the
strength and nature of the low-level processing and modulatory
feedback. We therefore recommend that when results are
conflicting and appear dependent on participant characteristics,
task demands or stimulus features, considering the results in light
of possible interplay between low- and high-level processes is
helpful.
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